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Abstract
Class actions, which allow individual plaintiffs to represent a group of 
others in a similar situation in a claim against a same defendant, are still a 
specificity of US law. Recently, transnational class actions, either against 
a foreign defendant or including foreign class members, have become 
popular. The author addresses the possibility of bringing such claims 
involving parties that are residents of a European country. The United 
States, traditionally known for the extraterritorial application of their laws 
and for easily retaining jurisdiction of their courts, are trying to 
coordinate the legal systems involved by being concerned with the 
possibility of recognition in a foreign country of class action judgments. 
Therefore, the original issue needs to be addressed of the recognition and 
the res judicata effect of these judgments in European countries that do 
not know similar collective judicial procedures. 
1 Introduction 
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In a globalised economy, the frequency of class actions brought before US 
courts involving a foreign element is extremely high. It is the existence of 
this foreign element that gives rise to private international law issues, which 
are particularly complex with regard to class actions procedures. The 
globalization of class actions is a recent phenomenon, which occurs when 
either the defendant or a putative class member resides outside the United 
States. For example, between 1998 and 2005, 145 securities class actions 
were brought before US courts against foreign private issuers (FPIs).53 The 
plaintiffs are usually shareholders that have acquired shares of the company 
and are asking for compensation for the damage suffered because of wrong 
information about the financial situation of the defendant on the market. 
Very often, shares are held not only by United States shareholders, but also, 
and sometimes predominantly, by Europeans. As a consequence, courts are 
confronted with several private international law issues. 
This article does not aim to discuss all private international law 
issues that arise in transnational class actions. According to US private 
international law, for example, the court has to determine whether it has 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant. It is not the 
purpose of this article to discuss this issue, but what is important is to note 
that very often US courts retain jurisdiction under the ‘conduct test’. In other 
words, the fact that the foreign defendant acted on US territory, even if this 
behaviour caused loss to foreign investors only, enlarges the possibility that 
claims will be brought against defendants residing abroad. Such was the 
case, for example, in the recent class action brought against Vivendi 
Universal, a corporation organized under the laws of France and shares of 
which are traded both on the New York Stock Exchange (American 
Depository Shares, ADSs) and the French Bourse, Euronext Paris (ordinary 
shares).54
However, regarding transnational class actions, US Courts have 
consistently ruled that certification of the class can be granted only if there is 
a good chance that a future class action judgment will be recognised abroad 
and, above all, both in the country of residence of the defendant and in the 
country of residence of the foreign absent class members. In Part II, I will 
53 Source, PwC, 2005 Securities Litigations Study, 57. Comparing this data with the 
total of 2021 securities class actions brought to court in the same period (same 
source, at 7), we note that FPIs are involved in 7.2% of the claims. However, only 
some of the FPIs are European companies. It shall also be noted that European legal 
systems are not concerned when the defendant is one of their residents, but also 
when an absent class member is, which drastically increases the situations in which 
a recognition of a class action judgement can be required in one or more European 
countries. 
54 Dismissing defendant motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, In re Vivendi 
Universal S.A., 381 West’s Federal Supplement 2d, at 169 (4 November 2003). 
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detail the conditions for certification and explain for which practical reasons 
US law requires future treatment of US judgments be taken into account. 
This is a necessary step in the analysis, since it shows why and under which 
terms the question of the future recognition by European countries needs to 
be discussed. After this discussion, I will tackle the core issue of the article: 
the position of some European legal systems regarding US class action 
judgments. Legal doctrine and legal practice have shown that there are three 
main reasons why courts in Europe could refuse Res Judicata effect to a 
class action judgment. In Part III, I will discuss the first reason, which is 
often alleged to be contrary to international public policy. It concerns the 
specific US class action device of the ‘opt-out rule’, which allows courts to 
include in the procedure all plaintiffs unless they manifest their will to be 
excluded from the class. The second reason for non-recognition, discussed in 
part IV, is that European legal systems may consider US judgments 
awarding punitive or multiple damages to be contrary to international public 
policy. Finally, and this will be discussed in Part V, in some European 
countries an obstacle for recognition of a foreign judgment is that according 
to the law of the European country where the Res Judicata effect is sought, 
the US court could retain jurisdiction. 
The study of these three issues and the recent evolution of European 
states law towards the introduction of collective procedures which are 
similar, though not identical, to the US class action procedures, seems to 
indicate a decrease of the hostility of European legal systems towards the US 
class action. This may signal an era in which there are fewer obstacles 
towards recognition of US class actions, which consequently will induce US 
courts to more easily certificate transnational class actions. 
2 US law requirements for the certification of transnational class actions 
2.1 Conditions for certification of class actions  
In order for US courts to accept to decide on a transnational class action, 
several conditions have to be fulfilled. Traditional conditions regarding 
international jurisdiction have to be met as mentioned above. The most 
topical admissibility requirement is the certification, which is peculiar to 
class actions procedures, and needs to be discussed. Indeed, the issue of 
international jurisdiction of US courts is not the only private international 
law problem that has to be addressed. Once jurisdiction has been established, 
the class, the group of plaintiffs, has to be certified pursuant to Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules on Civil Procedure, which sets the different conditions for 
the possibility of bringing a class action. The certification is a special stage 
of a class action procedure and aims at the constitution of the group of 
plaintiffs. For a class action to be certified, Rule 23(a) sets specific 
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requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of 
representation.55 If these conditions are fulfilled, the traditional procedure of 
Rule 23(b)(3), the ‘poor man’s class action’, requires additionally that: 
The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the 
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of 
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) 
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 
action.
The conditions contained in this provision are usually referred to as 
‘predominance’ and ‘superiority’. 
2.2 Transnational class actions 
Federal Rule 23 raises particular concerns in case of a transnational class 
action. Indeed, the existence of foreign elements in the litigation could make 
it much more difficult to establish ‘superiority’ of the class action treatment 
of the dispute over other, more traditional litigation techniques. Furthermore, 
‘predominance of common issues in law’ can be jeopardized by the 
differences in law that apply to the various putative class members. Such is 
for example the case in product liability class actions, where the action for 
compensation of the damage suffered by different members of the class may 
be governed by different laws when the lex loci delicti principle applies. In 
such a case, transnational class actions against the defendant are hard to 
certify or very difficult to manage because subclasses will need to be 
created. In turn, this may lead to splitting the litigation into several parts, at 
least on certain issues. This has happened not only in transnational class 
actions procedures, but also in litigation where class members were resident 
55 Rule 23(a): “Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law 
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defences of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defences of the class, and (4) the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 
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in different states within the US and the legal situation of the plaintiff was 
governed by the law of yet another state.  
A leading case of the US Supreme Court has shown the difficulty to 
certify a so-called multi-state class action, a class where members are spread 
over in various countries.56 Shutts is a leading case concerning the issue of 
personal jurisdiction of state courts as regards non-resident class members. 
The case is also important for the issue of difference of the law applicable to 
different putative class members. In this case, the class-seeking certification 
consisted of putative members residing in 27 states and 15 foreign countries. 
Arguing that it would simplify the procedure, Kansas courts applied the lex 
fori to all class members, although different laws should have been applied 
according to their residence. The Supreme Court rejected the idea of 
facilitating the application of the law of the court seized in multi-state class 
actions,57 considering that this could incite plaintiffs to adopt ‘forum 
shopping’ strategies.58 More recent examples of decertification on the 
grounds of the differences in the applicable laws include the class action 
brought by haemophiliacs against a pharmaceutical company after having 
contracted AIDS.59 This led authors to suggest an alternative solution in 
favour of the application of the law of a single legal system.60
If a single legal system can govern both the grounds and 
consequences of the defendant’s liability vis-à-vis all class members, this 
problem does not arise. In fact, this happens rather frequently at present 
because of the extraterritorial application of US federal law, for example in 
case of violation of federal securities laws (which nowadays is the most 
frequent ground for transnational class actions).61 In such a case, it is the 
56 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 The United States Reports. 797 (1985), 105 
The Supreme Court Reporter. 2965 (1985). On this case, see e.g. A. R. Miller, D. 
Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multi-state Class Actions After Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale Law Journal 1 (1986/1987). 
57 Some authors defend this idea, S. Lloyd Truax, ‘United States Class Actions in 
Private International Law Decisions’, 23 California Western Law Review 342 
(1986/1987).
58 Id. 105 The Supreme Court reporter 2965 (1985), at 2979, adding that in the case 
in point the laws of Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana were different as to the answer 
to the legal issue at hand. 
59 In re Rhône-Poulenc Rorer Incorporated, 51 West’s Federal Reporter, Third 
Series 1293 (7th Circ. 1995). 
60 See e.g. S. Issacharoff, ‘Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice 
of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act’, 106 Columbia Law Review 1839 
(2006), who argues that the law of the defendant should be systematically applied 
for standardized claims. 
61 In the past, securities class actions could not be certified because of the difference 
in law applicable, see e.g. Zandeman v. Joseph, 102 Federal Rules Decisions 924 
(N.D. Ind. 1984), considering that the choice of law rule of Indiana provides for the 
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other condition set by Rule 23(b)(3), the ‘superiority of class action 
treatment’, that raises difficult issues in cases involving foreign elements. 
Among the different elements that a court has to take into account when 
deciding certification there is one that has to be addressed in particular in 
multi-state or transnational class actions: the desirability or the undesirability 
of concentration of litigation in the particular forum of the court seized. In 
other words, the question is whether it is desirable to concentrate a claim that 
concerns several legal systems in a single forum localized in the US, or 
whether foreign courts should retain jurisdiction to hear the case in respect 
of at least some of the plaintiffs. 
2.3 The condition set in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone and its developments 
The answer to this question is straightforward: a class action is desirable 
only in cases where the foreign courts would recognize the Res Judicata
effects of the US court judgment. Such a solution can be found in the leading 
1970s case Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, in which it was ruled: 
[T]he management of a class action with many thousands of class 
members imposes tremendous burdens on overtaxed district 
courts, even when the class members are mostly in the United 
States and still more so when they are abroad. Also, while an 
American court need not abstain from entering judgment simply 
because of a possibility that a foreign court may not recognize or 
enforce it, the case stands differently when this is a near 
certainty.62
According to this leading case, in order to refuse certification of a class 
including foreign absent members, a mere possibility of refusal to recognize 
the American judgment abroad is not sufficient. Instead, ‘near certainty’ is 
required. The Bersch v. Drexel Firestone case involved securities litigation 
in which the defendant was a Canadian corporation. According to the rule 
mentioned here, the court refused to certify a class including foreign buyers 
of the shares and thus limited the certification to US residents. The Court 
considered that it appeared from the expert opinions presented to the court 
by law professors that English, French, German, Italian and Swiss courts 
would refuse to recognize the American class action judgment, especially if 
application of the law of residence of the investor, which would have jeopardized 
the manageability of the class action. See also, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 95 Federal Rules Decisions 168 (D. Del. 1982). 
62 519, West’s Federal Reporter, Second Series 974 (1975), at 996. 
2008]      Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments      37 
it were in favour of the defendant.63 The expert opinions asserted that the 
reasons for rejecting the Res Judicata were mainly to be found in the US rule 
that absent class members are automatically included in the class unless they 
manifestly express their intention to be excluded from the procedure. This 
rule is described as the ‘opt-out principle’. Following the expert legal 
opinions, it was therefore considered in this case that the opt-in requirement 
is fundamental to European legal systems and therefore a judgment rendered 
in respect of absent and even ignorant plaintiffs would be considered 
contrary to these countries’ concept of international public policy. 
In more recent cases, the requirement set by Bersch has been slightly 
modified and stricter conditions to the certification of a foreign class are 
often found. For instance, in the certification judgment of the Vivendi
Universal securities class action, judge Holwell considered that the 
‘superiority’ requirement is fulfilled when the plaintiffs prove that there is a 
considerable probability that a foreign court will recognise the American 
judgment.64 More precisely, foreign putative absent class members will have 
the possibility to be part of the procedure if “foreign court recognition [of 
their place of residence] is more likely than not.”65 In other words, 
certification of this group of plaintiffs will be granted if the chances of 
recognition abroad of the outcome of the class action litigation are above 50 
per cent. It is interesting to see that even though the conditions that are to be 
fulfilled in 2007 are stricter than in 1975, the Vivendi Universal certification
decision included foreign plaintiffs from France, the Netherlands and the 
UK. It merely excluded putative class members from Germany and Austria. 
This indicates that the Vivendi court considered that recognition of a class 
action judgment is probable and that the opt-out rule is no longer seen as 
generally contrary to public policy in Europe. 
Sooner or later, for the purpose of the certification of a transnational 
class action, the US court will have to explore the possibility of the future 
recognition and enforcement of its verdict abroad. Doing so will require 
exploring the conditions for recognition in other legal systems and therefore 
will also require the court to take into account foreign private international 
law rules. As a consequence, a US court has to apply its own system of 
private international law to assess jurisdiction and to determine the law 
applicable to the litigation, as well as give effect to foreign private 
international law rules. 
The requirement of taking into account, and thus giving effect to, 
foreign private international law is rather unusual. It is widely accepted that 
in principle a court merely has to apply the rules of private international law 
63 Id. at 997. 
64 In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, 241 Federal Rules Decisions
213, at 233 (S.D.N.Y.), 22 March 2007. 
65 Id.
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of the forum. Exceptions to this rule are conceivable, for example as regards 
the theory of renvoi, which leads to the application of the foreign choice of 
law rule of the legal system indicated by the choice of law rule of the 
forum.66 Indeed, the attention given to foreign private international law in 
transnational class actions demonstrates the intention of the US legal system 
not to impose its solution worldwide and instead to coordinate conflicting 
sovereignties in dealing with globalised litigation. 
There is also a practical element to be considered. The fact that US 
Courts examine the potential recognition abroad of a US class action 
judgment does not aim at exploring the possibilities of enforcement. In fact, 
such enforcement will not be necessary in every case, because the defendant 
may have sufficient property in the US to pay the damages that the court 
may award against him. Why then is the absence of recognition seen as a 
problem? If recognition abroad were not an obstacle for satisfying the 
plaintiffs, even though their residence is abroad, one would think that the 
condition set by Bersch is useless. This, however, is not the case. The 
absence of recognition would be problematic if the US court were to decide 
in favour of the defendant. It is important to recognize the Res Judicata of 
the class action verdict in order to prevent deceived foreign class members 
from bringing a new claim against the very same defendant before a foreign 
court and especially the court of the plaintiff’s place of residence. If that 
were possible, the defendant – being prevented from opposing the Res 
Judicata in the US – would face new claims relating to the same facts and 
run a new risk of paying damages. In the end, different courts may come to 
diverging solutions. The requirement of a foreign recognition is therefore at 
the same time a sign of respect for foreign legal systems and of protection of 
the defendant in a class action procedure. This requirement indicates that the 
US legal system is concerned with the question whether the extraterritorial 
application of its laws or the large jurisdiction of its courts is acceptable for 
other legal systems. The requirement also signals that the procedural rights 
of the defendant of a class action are taken into account. 
As a consequence of the condition set by Bersch, in many European 
legal systems an important doctrinal debate is now taking place regarding the 
possibility to recognize a US class action judgment. In the absence of a clear 
line of the case law, the Res Judicata of a US class action ruling is uncertain 
most of the time. Moreover, the specificities of such a procedure make it 
nearly impossible to apply reasoning by analogy, simply because European 
courts have not had the opportunity to rule on similar situations. Moreover, 
the doctrinal debate presents particular features because it does not take 
66 On this theory, Ph. Francescakis, La théorie du renvoi et les conflits de systèmes 
en droit international privé (Paris: Sirey 1958). 
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place in legal journals or other scholarly publications.67 The fact is that most 
of the leading experts in the field of private international law in Europe are 
currently requested and accepting to give expert legal opinions (the term 
often used is affidavit) in the framework of pending class actions. Therefore, 
the legal arguments in favour of and against the Res Judicata effect of a 
class action judgment in most of the European countries are to be found in 
these expert opinions. The opinions are accessible to the public either on 
Westlaw or on the ad hoc websites edited for the purposes of the information 
of the interested parties to the litigation.68 The specificities of the doctrinal 
debate oblige the observer to consider the possibility of partiality of the 
expert opinion. Even if the expert asserts that the content of the opinion is 
positive law by using expressions such as “I declare under penalty or perjury 
under the laws of United States of America that the foregoing is true and 
correct”, it is remarkable to see that in the very same procedure and 
concerning the very same country, the experts will diverge considerably in 
their views. This divergence is explained by the uncertainty of the answer 
and also by the fact that American courts do not require a certainty of 
recognition, but merely a strong probability. 
The purpose of this article is not to give a clear-cut answer to the 
question whether European courts will give Res Judicata effect to US class 
action rulings. Such an effort would be utopian. Instead, of interest here is 
the determination of the reasons of potential refusal of recognition. These 
reasons seem to be based on the idea that the features of a class action 
procedure offend the very foundations of domestic law of the European legal 
systems. There are mainly three features of a class actions judgment that are 
relevant in this respect. In the following parts, the issue of recognition will 
be discussed by dealing firstly with the opt-out rule and its compatibility 
with European civil procedure; secondly, with the possibility under US law 
to award punitive damages along with compensatory damages; and thirdly 
how jurisdiction of US Courts holds according to European private 
international law rules. At the end of this analysis it will be concluded that 
European legal systems are presently less allergic to class-action-like 
procedures than they used to be. 
67 There are a few exceptions: J. C.L. Dixon, ‘The Res Judicata Effect in England of 
a US Class Action Settlement’, 46 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 134 
(1997); I. Romy, ‘Class actions américaines et droit international privé suisse’, 
Annales des justices de paix 1999, 796; M.-L. Niboyet, ‘Actions de groupe et droit 
international privé’, Revue Lamy de Droit Civil 2006, n° 32; M. Matousekova, 
‘Would French Courts Enforce US Class Actions Judgments?’, Contratto e Impresa 
Europa, 2006, 651; and the German legal doctrine quoted infra, n. 85 . 
68 Such is also the case for the Royal Ahold class action, 
<www.royalaholdsecuritieslitigation.com>. 
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3 The opt-out mechanism and Res Judicata in Europe 
3.1 The conformity with the public policy of the forum 
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are not mandatory for plaintiffs. However, 
putative absent class members will be part of the litigation unless they 
expressly manifest their intention to be excluded. In other words, one can 
become a plaintiff without having asked to become one. Traditionally, in all 
European legal systems the principle is that one becomes a plaintiff only by 
having actually manifested one’s intention to bring a claim and by not 
remaining silent. Therefore, it is almost certain that European legal systems 
will give Res Judicata effect to ‘opt-in’ class-actions judgments, but this is 
not self-evident regarding opt-out class actions. It has been argued by several 
experts that the binding effect of a class-action procedure over absent class 
members residing in European countries could be contrary to public policy 
and that the outcome of such procedures can therefore not be recognized by 
domestic courts.69 Other experts have argued the contrary.70 It is impossible 
69 Between the very large amount of expert opinions submitted before US courts in 
class actions proceedings in the recent years, the following argue that an opt-out 
mechanism is contrary to public policy in some European countries. In Austrian law, 
G. Kodek declaration in Royal Dutch Shell class action. In Belgian law, H. van 
Houtte, declaration in Royal Dutch Shell class action. In Dutch law, Th.M. De Boer 
declaration in Royal Ahold class action, H. A. Groen declaration in Royal Dutch 
Shell class action. In English law, E. Peel declaration in Royal Ahold class action, C. 
Staughton declaration in Royal Dutch Shell class action, L. Rabinowitz declaration 
in Vivendi Universal class action. In French law, P. Mayer declaration in Royal 
Ahold class action; B. Audit, F. Terré, D. Cohen, G. Geouffre de la Pradelle, G. 
Carcassonne, O. Renard-Payen declarations in Vivendi Universal class action; J. 
Lemontey declaration in Royal Dutch Shell class action. In German law, R. Stüner 
declarations in Royal Ahold and Daimler Chrysler class actions, W. Grunsky 
declaration in Royal Dutch Shell class action, G. Herman Otto Wegen declaration in 
Vivendi Universal class action. In Luxembourg law, G. Ravarani declaration in 
Royal Dutch Shell class action. In Swiss law, P. Oberhammer declaration in Royal 
Ahold Class action, G. Kaufmann-Kohler declaration in Royal Dutch Shell class 
action. All declarations are on file with author. 
70 See, e.g., in Austrian law, D. Czernich and B. Rudisch declarations in Royal 
Dutch Shell class action. In Belgian law, G. Horsmans, declaration in Royal Dutch 
Shell class action. In Dutch law, H. Smit declarations in Royal Ahold, Royal Dutch 
Shell and Vivendi Universal class actions. In English law, J. Harris declarations in 
Royal Dutch Shell and Vivendi Universal class actions. In French law, A. Mourre 
declarations in Royal Ahold, Royal Dutch Shell and Vivendi Universal class actions. 
In German law, P. Mankowski declarations in Royal Dutch Shell, Vivendi Universal
2008]      Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments      41 
in the framework of this article to detail the different reasoning and nuances 
expressed by the authors of these expert opinions. What particularly strikes 
the observer, however, is the fact that the issue presents itself in a very 
similar way in all of the legal systems analysed here. Even if the legal 
grounds are not always the same, it is clear that everywhere in Europe the 
main problem with US class actions is the opt-out mechanism and its 
asserted contrariety to the domestic foundations of civil procedure. 
The concept of public policy, referred to in many European countries 
with the French ordre public, relates to the comparison of a judgment – the 
merit, but also the adjudicating procedure – with the fundamental legal 
values of the forum where the judgement aims at producing its effects in 
case of a request for recognition of the foreign judgment.71 What counts 
therefore is the outcome of the case, and not whether the legal provisions 
that underpin the outcome are contrary to public policy in abstract terms. It 
is a very concrete analysis that has to be carried out by the judge who has to 
decide on the recognition of a foreign judgment. When it comes to 
procedural public policy such as the opt-out rule of a US class action, the 
concrete and the abstract analysis coincide. Indeed, European courts have to 
determine whether the fact that absent European class members can be 
included in the class, simply because they have not opted out, is contrary to 
the fundaments of civil procedure. Deciding on this issue is not an easy task. 
International public policy does not prevent a juridical situation created 
abroad to produce effect in the forum simply because the legal institution or 
the procedure applied do not exist. In other words, the mere fact that a legal 
rule or a procedural tool that does not exist, or even could not be enacted, in 
the country where a foreign judgment is asked to produce its Res Judicata
effects, is not enough to consider the foreign judgment to be contrary to 
public policy. The application of foreign rules is only contrary to the 
international public policy of the forum if these rules contradict the main, 
essential and fundamental legal principles of the forum. According to a 
leading French case, there is violation of public policy when a judgment 
infringes “principles of universal justice considered as having, in French 
opinion, absolute universal value”.72
and Daimler Chrysler class actions. In Swiss law, S. Baumgartner, declaration in 
Royal Dutch Shell class action. All declarations are on file with author. 
71 For a comparative analysis of this concept in private international law, see P. 
Lagarde, ‘Public Policy’, in 3 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Ch. 
11, 1994; J. Blom, ‘Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution in 
Time’, 50 Netherlands International Law Review 373 (2003). 
72 Civ. I, 25 May 1948, Lautour, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 1949, 
89, with note H. Batiffol; Recueil Dalloz 1948, 357, with note P. L.-P.; Recueil Sirey
1949, 1, 21, with note Niboyet. 
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There are two ways to determine whether an opt-out class action is contrary 
to public policy. The first and most straightforward method is to verify 
whether there are similar, even if more confined, procedures in the law of the 
forum that bind plaintiffs according to an opt-out mechanism. This is still 
uncommon in European legal systems, but views have certainly changed in 
recent years. Clear examples of this are the collective claims procedures that 
have been enacted in the Netherlands, France and in a more limited way in 
England. The second method consists of analysing whether a legal institution 
unknown in the forum can still be considered compatible with its 
fundamental concepts. Such an analysis is more difficult, but it cannot be 
taken for granted that recognition should be refused simply because the legal 
system where recognition is sought does not know a class-action-like 
procedure, including an opt-out mechanism, such as in Germany. 
3.2 The Netherlands 
According to article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code, non-profit associations 
can bring a claim in representation of the category of persons (consumers, 
investors, et cetera) whose interests they defend. The court can give 
declaratory relief concerning liability of the defendant, which can be invoked 
later by the individual persons who were represented in the first procedure, 
in individual claims for damages. The Res Judicata effect of this collective 
judgment on the principle of liability is not as strong as the Res Judicata
effect of a US class action.  
However, article 7:907 of the Dutch Civil Code clearly uses an opt-
out mechanism for cases of collective ‘friendly’ settlement. This article was 
enacted in 2005 by the Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages (Wet 
collectieve afwikkeling massaschade). This provision allows parties to a 
settlement agreement to request that the Amsterdam Appellate Court declare 
the settlement binding upon a class of persons having suffered similar losses. 
Therefore, if the association representing consumers or investors agrees with 
the defendant on a settlement of the litigation, its effects could extend to all 
victims, unless they opt out and thus express the intention not to be bound. 
The similarity of this procedure with the underlying principles of a US class 
action, even though its effects are more limited, is evident and considerably 
limits the risks of non-recognition of a US class action judgment.73 This 
73 M.V. Polak, ‘Iedereen en overal?: Internationaal privaatrecht rond 
“massaclaims”’, 41 Nederlands Juristenblad 2346 (2006), is of the opinion that the 
opt-out must have been a real option, so in case of a US certified class action the 
Dutch interested parties must have had a real opportunity to opt out. 
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induced Judge Holwell in the Vivendi Universal class action to certify a 
class of plaintiffs, including investors residing in the Netherlands.74
3.3 England 
The same probably holds true for English law, which allows, in a more 
limited fashion than in the US, collective claims that bind absent plaintiffs. 
Such a rule can be found in the 1988 Civil Procedure Rules, where section 
19(6) clearly introduces such a solution: 
Representative parties with same interest. 
(1) Where more than one person has the same interest in a claim 
(a) the claim may be begun; or 
(b) the court may order that the claim be continued, 
by or against one or more of the persons who have the same 
interest as representatives of any other persons who have that 
interest. 
(2) The court may direct that a person may not act as a 
representative. 
(3) Any party may apply to the court for an order under   
paragraph (2). 
(4) Unless the court otherwise directs any judgment or order given 
in a claim in which a party is acting as a representative under this 
rule 
(a) is binding on all persons represented in the claim; but 
(b) may only be enforced by or against a person who is not a 
party to the claim with the permission of the court.75
Of course, English law introduces solutions that are different from what is in 
force in the US. The possibility, however, of including an absent party as a 
plaintiff without their express consent is sufficient to consider an opt-out 
mechanism to not be incompatible with the English legal system; therefore a 
refusal of recognition of an American class action judgment cannot be based 
solely on these grounds.76 In England the issue has sometimes been 
addressed as an issue of personal jurisdiction concerning non-resident class 
members. However, section 19(6) of the Civil Procedure Rules does not 
74 In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, 241 Federal Rules Decisions
213, at 243 (S.D.N.Y.), 22 March 2007. 
75 See, N. Andrews, ‘Multi-Party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group 
Actions’, 11 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 249 (2001).
76 This is also the conclusion of J. C.L. Dixon, ‘The Res Judicata Effect in England 
of a US Class Action Settlement’, 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
134 (1997), at 145 ff. 
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require the absent member to be residing in the forum in order to be bound. 
Consequently, US courts do not see why it should not be the same for the 
recognition of a foreign judgment that includes an English resident as absent 
member.77 However, the main issue is indeed to know whether an opt-out 
US class action judgment is contrary to English public policy. It is true that 
foreign judgments are not enforceable in England if they are contrary to 
natural justice or public policy and this also implies an assessment of 
procedural guarantees. Considering the similarity of the English 
representative and collective actions regulation to the class-action system in 
the US, it is likely that the Res Judicata effect will indeed be granted.78
3.4 France 
A similar reasoning can be followed in French law. It is true that France has 
a long-standing principle according to which nul ne plaide par procureur,
that is, no one may claim in court by proxy. Additionally, it has been 
considered by several experts that requiring a plaintiff to actively opt out in 
order to be excluded from the class of plaintiffs would be contrary to 
principles of due process, according to which every litigant shall have 
personal freedom to appear and be heard in court during any proceedings 
affecting their rights. However, in French law there are also examples of opt-
out collective claims, such as the one brought by a trade union on behalf of 
employees for the protection of their individual interests.79 The conditions 
for bringing such an action are that the employees receive notice, that they 
do not refuse to be bound by it and that they have been identified or are at 
least identifiable. In 1989 the French Constitutional Court had the 
opportunity to examine and confirm the conformity of such an opt-out 
mechanism with the Constitution and the Declaration of Human and Citizen 
Rights of 1789, although it did require additional guarantees regarding the 
individual freedom of employees.80 The Constitutional Court in particular 
accepts allowing trade unions the possibility of bringing a collective claim 
through an individual case including all employees who did not opt out, but 
77 In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, above n. 74 
78 Legal doctrine is uncertain on the issue. If J.C.L. Dixon is of the opinion that a 
judgement has a ‘good chance’ to have Res Judicata effect in England (J.C.L. 
Dixon, ‘The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action Settlement’ above 
n. 76 at 150), other authors are more sceptical. Such is the case for P. Barnett, Res
Judicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgment, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) 
74; A. Briggs, P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, (London: LLP 2005, 4th
ed.) 573. 
79 Artt. L. 122-3-16, L. 123-6, L. 124-20, L. 125-3-1, L. 135-4, L. 321-15, L. 341-6-
2, L. 721-19 of the French Labour Code. 
80 CC 25 July 1989, 89-257 DC, Droit social 1989, 627. 
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it does require that the employee be notified of this initiative and that such a 
notification explains clearly the object of the claim and the possibility for the 
employee to be excluded from the class “at any time”. It is clear that the 
requirements of the Constitutional Court for the introduction of a class action 
in France are more stringent than those in force in the US, especially because 
in French law the absent class member can exclude himself from the 
procedure at any time before the final judgment, and not only during a 
predetermined opt-out period. However, this does not seem sufficient to 
consider an opt-out US class action judgment contrary to French public 
policy. As noted above, international public policy only prevents a legal 
situation totally incompatible with the foundations of the law of the forum to 
produce effects on its territory. Indeed, it is said that public policy has a 
reduced effect (effet atténué) when it comes to the recognition of a juridical 
situation created abroad, as opposed to a strictly interior matter, that is in the 
case when a court has to decide whether a such juridical situation can be 
created on French territory.81 This means that the fact that the French 
legislator cannot enact a rule because of constitutional requirements does not 
necessarily imply that a foreign legislator or judge will be bound by the same 
requirements. On the contrary, it is more likely that the Constitutional 
Court’s decision of 1989 shows that there is no ‘allergy’ of the French legal 
system to the US opt-out mechanism and that there are only divergences on 
its modalities and the way the opt-out right can be exercised. There should 
be no reason therefore to refuse Res Judicata effect in France of a US class 
action judgment on this ground. This is in fact also the analysis made by 
Judge Holwell in the Vivendi Universal class action.82
However, in the petition to appeal, the Vivendi company submitted a 
brief from the French Ministry of Justice, signed by the Director of Civil 
Affairs, indicating that a US class action judgment is contrary to French 
procedural public policy and that French Courts will refuse to enforce it.83 It 
is difficult to anticipate the effect of such an intervention of the French 
government. What is certain is that it is unusual for the French executive to 
intervene in a dispute between private parties. Giving such an expert opinion 
on a critical issue of French law can be clearly seen as both a violation of the 
separation of powers and a protective attitude towards the companies 
organised under its own laws. 
81 The line of case law on ‘effet atténué’ was started by the Rivière case, Cass. Civ. I, 
17 April 1953, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 1953, 412, with 
annotation H. Batiffol; Journal du Droit International 1953, 860, with annotation G. 
Plaisant. 
82 In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, above n. 74 
83 Letter dated 3 April, 2007 (on file with author). 
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3.5 Germany 
The first way of addressing the public policy issue is to verify whether there 
are similar procedural tools in the legal system of the foreign forum. If that is 
the case, the Bersch test is positive and, most of the time, the US court then 
certifies a class including the relevant absent class members. By contrast, the 
second way of approaching the public policy problem of an opt-out 
mechanism is much more difficult. This approach is followed in order to 
satisfy the test whenever the foreign forum does not make use of similar 
procedural tools. Such is the case for Germany, for example, where, contrary 
to the Netherlands, England and France, class-action mechanisms are still 
unknown. This absence excludes recognition of foreign judgments that are 
manifestly incompatible with the principles of German law, in particular 
with fundamental rights.84
The only comparison that could be made is with the Investor 
Protection Model Procedure Act, entered into force on 1 November 2005, 
which organises multiple claims by shareholders regarding the loss suffered 
as a consequence of wrong, incorrect or lack of information on the situation 
of a company (Gesetz zur Einführung von Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren,
KapMuG). This procedure, however, is very different from a US securities 
class action, in the sense that shareholders who do not voluntarily take part 
in the procedure will not be bound by its results.85 In other words, this 
procedure is based on an opt-in, not an opt-out system. Since the opt-out 
mechanism is the feature of US class actions that generates the highest 
difficulties for their foreign recognition, the fact that it was rejected by the 
German legislator in securities litigations cannot indicate that German courts 
will grant Res Judicata effect to a US judgment. 
However, one cannot conclude that there is a very high probability 
of non-recognition, because it still needs to be ascertained that the German 
legal procedural law foundations are incompatible with an opt-out 
mechanism. The mere inexistence of it under the German law of civil 
procedure is insufficient. In other words, the recognition of a foreign 
judgment delivered on the basis of a foreign legal rule or institution 
unknown in the forum does not necessarily amount to a violation of the 
forum’s concept of international public policy. The opposite, however, is the 
conclusion drawn by US courts in both the Vivendi Universal and Daimler 
Chrysler securities litigations, when they certify class actions and exclude 
84 § 328 (1) (4) ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung).
85 For a comparison of US class actions with the KapMuG, see R. M. Franklin, 
‘Truiken J. Heydn, KapMuG: Class Actions vor deutschen Gerichten?’, 105 
Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 313 (2006). 
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German absent class members.86 This is also the conclusion of the vast 
majority of German doctrine in considering that the inclusion of absent class 
members without their consent violates plaintiffs’ fundamental rights.87
Although it is not certain that non-recognition “is more likely than 
not” and therefore that the superiority test could have very well led to a 
certification of the class action, one has to assess the consequences of the 
non-inclusion of German residents to a US class actions. Some will analyse 
this solution as an advantage for German multinationals, which benefit from 
a sort of immunity from US class actions. However, this is not the case if 
most of the plaintiffs are not German residents, because then the class action 
will receive certification anyway and the German residents will not benefit 
from the resulting proceeds.88 More exactly, the consequences of a refusal of 
recognition of a US class action can better be seen as a reduction of the 
protection of German resident plaintiffs. They can, indeed, only bring a 
claim in their own country and, therefore, cannot benefit from the 
advantages offered by a US class action procedure.  
As noted above, the German legislator has recently enacted an ad 
hoc procedural scheme for securities litigations in 2005 because individual 
claim threatened to congest some first instance courts. As a side issue, the 
question can be raised whether such a procedure could be of use for 
securities litigations against corporations organised under the laws of a 
different EU member state. Indeed, the application of the Brussels I 
Regulation (2001/44) does not provide a jurisdiction prong to the courts of 
the place of residence of the investors, since they merely would have a 
choice between seizing the court of the place of residence of the defendant 
86 In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, above n. 74; In re Daimler 
Chrysler AG Securities Litigation, 216 Federal Rules Decisions 291 (D. Del. 2003).  
87 See e.g. H. Spindler, ‘Die amerikanische Institution der class action als Mittel des 
Konsumentenschutzes’, in Festschrift für Eugen Ulmer, Munich 1973, 369 ff; R. 
Mann, ‘Die Anerkennungsfähigkeit von US-amerikanischen “Class-action”-
Urteilen’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1994, 1187; J. Mark, ‘Amerikanische 
Class Action und deutsches Zivilprozessrecht’, Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht 1994, 238; Ch. Greiner, ‘Die “Class Action” im amerikanischen 
Recht und deutscher “, Ordre Public”’, (Frankfurt a. M.: Max-Planck-Institut,  1998) 
at 185 ff. Contra, J.C. Spindler, ‘Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausländischer 
Prozessvergleiche unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der US-amerikanischen Class 
Actions Settlements’, (Konstanz: Konstanzer Schriften zur Rechtswissenschaft, 
2001), 246, who suggests that the opt-out mechanism of Rule 23 is an appropriate 
device to protect absent class members’ fundamental rights. 
88 More recently, regarding Daimler Chrysler, an attempt to certify a class composed 
of foreign class members only has been rejected on the argument of the absence of 
jurisdiction of US courts, Markus Blechner et alii, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated plaintiffs v. Daimler-Benz AG, Daimler Chrysler AG et alii, 
410 West’s Federal Supplement.2d 366 (2006). 
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(article 2) and the court of the country where the harmful event occurred 
(article 5(3)).  
Regarding the latter, the provision seems to suggest that the harmful 
event does not occur at the place of residence of the investor, but rather in 
the country where the shares were traded (which often coincides with the 
country of the company incorporation).89 This is not necessarily true, 
however, if the case involves misleading information that the company 
addressed to foreign investors at their place of residence in Germany. 
Following the interpretation of article 5(3) given by the European Court of 
Justice in the Mines de Potasse d’Alsace case, the place where the “harmful 
event occurred” is either the place where the tort can be located or the place 
where the damage was suffered by the victim.90 According to the Fiona 
Shevill case of 1995 concerning breach of privacy committed by a press 
publication, the courts of all the countries where the publication was sold can 
retain jurisdiction limited to the damage suffered as a consequence of its 
distribution in that country.91 In security litigations, all this would mean that 
German courts would indeed have jurisdiction in an action brought against a 
company incorporated in a different member state, but limited to the damage 
suffered by the investors who are German residents. 
Having said that, I should add that the collective claim procedure 
(KapMuG) only applies to security litigations and not to other wrongs that 
can give rise to class actions in the US. This means that the exclusion of 
German absent class members will require individual actions, even though 
some of these could be brought before German courts according to the 
consumer jurisdiction prong of the Brussels I Regulation.92 To conclude, in 
the Vivendi Universal case the exclusion of German investors from the US 
89 Art. 5, Brussels I Regulation: “A person domiciled in a Member State may, in 
another Member State, be sued: >…@ (3) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-
delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.” 
90 ECJ, 30 November 1975, C-21-76, Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA,
[1976] European Court Reports 1735; Recueil Dalloz-Sirey. 1977, 613, with 
annotation Droz; Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 1977, 563, with 
annotation P. Bourel; Journal du Droit International 1977, 728, with annotation A. 
Huet; Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1977, 493. 
91 ECJ, 7 March 1995, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, [1995] 
European Court Reports I-415; [1995] 2 Law Reports, Appeal Cases 18; [1995] 2 
Weekly Law Reports 499; [1995] All England Law Reports European Cases 289; 
[1995] International Litigation Procedure 267; [1995] Entertainment and Media Law 
Reports. 543; Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 1996, 487, with 
annotation P. Lagarde; Journal du Droit International 1996, 543, with annotation A. 
Huet; Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, 1882. 
92 Artt. 15-17 of the Brussels I Regulation introduce a particular consumer 
jurisdiction prong. 
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class action did not necessarily oblige these investors to bring a claim in 
France individually. In practice, such individual cross-border claims are very 
unlikely to be submitted anyway, at least on a large scale. This is because 
collective actions are often alternatives to the practical impossibility to 
access justice individually as a result of the frequent disproportion between 
legal costs and the compensation that can be expected from a successful 
judgment. However, such a solution is not satisfactory for the defendant and 
the plaintiffs. The defendant is obliged to appear before the courts in 
different jurisdictions and the plaintiffs could face diverging judicial 
decisions, even though the facts of the case are identical. 
When all is said and done, it appears that the opt-out mechanism is 
the feature of US class actions that causes the most difficulties in practice 
and could lead to non-recognition of a judgment delivered following this 
procedure. Consequently, a US court, confronted with  the question of 
certification of a transnational class action including foreign and especially 
European absent class members, could hesitate and either limit the 
certification of a class to include only class members residing in the US or 
simply refuse certification altogether on the ground of lack of superiority. 
However, the recent initiatives of several European legal systems to 
introduce class actions or procedural techniques of consolidation of 
individual judicial application into collective claims, some by including an 
opt-out mechanism, tend to indicate that the hostility towards class actions is 
disappearing progressively. This should facilitate the recognition, at least in 
some European legal systems, of US class action judgments, since the 
contrariety to public policy of the forum can hardly be upheld. 
A similar reasoning can be followed as regards the possibility for US 
courts to award punitive or multiple damages. Moreover, this issue is easier 
to solve, since the Res Judicata effect can be granted independently to the 
compensatory part of the judgment, even though punitive or multiple 
damages awards can face a refusal of recognition. That part of the judgment 
may then meet the requirements set in Bersch v. Drexel, as will be seen in 
the next part of this article. 
4 Punitive and multiple damages awards and Res Judicata in Europe 
If the opt-out mechanism is indeed very rarely contrary to the international 
public policy (ordre public international) of the European legal systems 
analysed above, the opposite can be said for the possibility to award punitive 
or treble damages, which is often possible in the framework of a US class 
action. For example, in antitrust suits, according to section 6 of the Clayton 
Act, compensatory damages are automatically multiplied by three.93 In fact, 
93 15 U.S.C. §15: “[…] any person who shall be injured in his business of property 
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue […] and shall recover 
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the issue that has to be addressed equally concerns all types of damages that 
can be awarded by a US court and that do not have a compensatory function 
but a preventive or deterring one instead. Traditionally, European legal 
systems deny courts the power to award damages – neither in contractual nor 
in extra-contractual matters – that go beyond what is necessary to 
compensate the injury suffered by the victim. Punitive damages are really a 
peculiarity of US law and can therefore limit the recognition of US judgment 
awarding them in Europe.94 As regards ordinary procedures and not class 
actions, there is case law in many European jurisdictions where recognition 
has been refused on the ground of contrariety to public policy. 
4.1 Germany 
Such is clearly the case for Germany, according to both the Federal Court 
(1992 decision) and the Constitutional Court (2003 decision).95 Moreover, 
the new German law on private international law on extra-contractual 
obligations of 1999 contains a provision that seems to exclude the 
recognition of foreign judgments in which a provision has been applied that 
leads to a different outcome on the issue of damages than German domestic 
law.96 This provision leads to a refusal of recognition when either the 
function or the amount of damages differs from what is accepted under 
German law. A similar approach can be found in Switzerland, even though 
the line of case law is not clearly established.97 However, it is feasible that 
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee.” 
94 On the question in general, R.A. Brand, ‘Punitive Damages and the Recognition 
of Judgments’, 43 Netherlands International Law Review 143 (1996). 
95 BGH, 4 June 1992, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 118, 
312, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1992, 3096, with annotation H. Koch; English 
translation in (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 1327; BVerfG 25 July 2003, 
2 BVR 1198/03. On the latter, B. Friedrich, ‘Federal Constitutional Court Grants 
Interim Legal Protection Against Service of a Writ of Punitive Damages’, 4 German 
Law Journal 1233 (2003). 
96 Art. 40(3) of the introductory law to the BGB: Claims governed by foreign law 
cannot be relied on if: 1. They go considerably beyond what a reasonable 
compensation of the injured party requires, 2. They serve objectives that are 
manifestly different from a reasonable compensation of the injured party. (author’s 
translation) 
97 In favour of the recognition, Trib. civ. Basel, 1 February 1989, quoted by R.A. 
Brand, ‘Punitive Damages and the Recognition of Judgments’, Netherlands 
International Law Review 1996, 143, at 169. However, a more recent case of the 
Swiss Federal tribunal retaining the criminal penalty qualification may lead the 
observer to think that a recognition is impossible, Arrêts du Tribunal Federal 
Suisse: Recueil Officiel 122 III 463, at 466 (1996). In legal doctrine, C. Lenz, 
2008]      Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments      51 
the situation will change with the enactment of provisions that allow 
disgorgement of profits from the tort-feasor. Such provisions have both 
deterring and punitive functions and therefore converge with the basic idea 
of punitive damages. Such is the case for article 28(a)(3) of the Swiss Civil 
Code, which allows courts to award the victim of a breach of privacy both 
compensatory damages and a sum equal to the profits gained by its author.98
4.2 England 
The same approach to punitive damages can be found in English law, 
notably in the recent case of Lewis v. Eliades99 concerning the issue of 
English public policy under the Protection of Trading Interest Act 1980. The 
1980 Act provides that a judgment of an overseas country cannot be 
registered and no court in England may entertain proceedings at common 
law for the recovery of any sum payable under such a judgment, where that 
judgment is for multiple damages. Section 5(3) of the Act defines multiple 
damages as an “amount arrived at by doubling, trebling or otherwise 
multiplying a sum assessed as compensation for the loss or damage sustained 
by the person in whose favour the judgment was given”. The question was 
whether an award for punitive damages can be granted Res Judicata in 
England is governed by this provision, as it only concerns multiple damages. 
The recognition of a punitive damages award cannot be denied on its penal 
law characterisation according to section 14(3) of the Private International 
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, in view of its probable 
recognition in England.100
In Lewis v. Eliades, a part of the compensatory damages was trebled 
in application of US Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations laws 
(RICO).101 In the proceedings to enforce the judgment in the UK, the issue 
was raised whether the entire judgment was unenforceable or the non-
recognition should be limited to the multiple damages award. In other words, 
can a US judgment awarding compensatory and punitive or multiple 
damages be enforced for the compensatory part or shall the enforcement be 
‘Amerikanische Punitive Damages vor dem Schweizer Richter’, Études Suisses de 
droit international 147, 1992; Y.P. Piantino, ‘Switzerland’s Treatment of US Money 
Judgments’, 46 American Journal of Comparative Law, 181 (1998). 
98 For a recent application, Swiss Federal Tribunal, 7 December 2006, Arrêts du 
Tribunal Federal Suisse: Recueil Officiel 133 III 153, disgorgement of the profits 
made by a newspaper because of the breach of privacy. 
99 Lewis v. Eliades >2003@ 1 All England Law Reports (Commercial Cases) 850; 
Elaine Kellman, ‘Enforcement of Judgments on Blocking Statutes, Lewis v Eliades’, 
53 International Law & Comparative Law Quarterly 1025 ( 2004). 
100 See, P.M. North, J.J. Fawcett and G.C. Cheshire (eds.) Cheshire and North’s 
Private International Law, (London: Butterworths 1999, 13th ed.) 118. 
101 18 U.S.S.C. 1964(c). 
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refused entirely? In this question, the Court of Appeal ruled that the 1980 
Act prevents the enforcement of the non-compensatory damages award only, 
granting it for the rest.102 The question remains whether the compensatory 
element of a multiple award can be enforced. My impression is that the 
answer should be affirmative, since an exception, being general public 
policy and having been introduced by a special statute, is to be interpreted 
strictly. Moreover, as regards punitive damages awards, a US court is under 
the obligation to distinguish between mere compensatory damages and 
punitive damages. In other words, US case law is clearly of the opinion that 
a judgment cannot award a lump sum with both a compensatory and a 
punitive function. This is an essential precondition to enable superior courts 
to assess whether the balance between compensatory and punitive damages 
is proportional or excessive. In the latter case this would lead the superior 
court to conclude that due process provisions of the US Constitution have 
been violated.103
Regardless of this issue, looking at the Lewis v Eliades case from the 
perspective of the issue of Res Judicata effects of a US class action 
judgment, one can conclude that the depeçage (severability) of a judgment in 
enforceable and unenforceable parts will support certification of class 
actions, including absent class members from England, even though the 
judgment does in fact award punitive or multiple damages.104 Indeed, what 
counts for US courts is the fact that an absent class member residing in 
England will be barred from bringing a claim in that part of the UK; this will 
certainly be the case if the prospective US judgment in the class-action case 
has Res Judicata effect, albeit only in part. It is important to note here that 
the principle of severability in Res Judicata procedures is more and more 
102 Contrary, in legal doctrine, A.V. Dicey, J.H.C. Morris, L.A. Collins, A. Briggs 
(eds.) The Conflicts of laws, Vol. 1 (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2000, 13th ed.) at. 
566, §§ 14-246: “Judgments caught by section 5 are wholly unenforceable, and not 
merely as regards that part of the judgment which exceeds the damages actually 
suffered by the judgment creditor.” This opinion was expressed before Lewis v. 
Eliades.
103 The leading case is the Supreme Court opinion in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 111 West’s Supreme Court Reporter 1032 (1991), where it was held that in 
itself a punitive damages award is not unconstitutional in itself, particular awards 
can transgress Constitutional guarantees.  
104 The same goes for Germany, where according to legal doctrine the judgment 
would be only partly unenforceable, J. Mark, ‘Amerikanische Class Action und 
deutsches Zivilprozessrecht’, Europäischen Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 238 
1994. This is also the solution held by BGH, 4 June 1992, ‘Entscheidungen des 
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen’ 118, 312, quoted above n. 95, where the 
American judgment was enforced as regards compensatory judgment and refused for 
the punitive damages award. 
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strongly defended in legal doctrine. One example is the Convention on 
choice of court agreements of 30 June 2005, which provides that even 
though a country can refuse to recognise punitive damages awards if these 
are excessive or not generally awarded in the forum (article 11 Damages),105
recognition can be refused only for the punitive damages part of the foreign 
judgment (article 15 Severability).106
4.3 France 
Of all European countries, France is probably where the recognition of a US 
multiple and punitive damages award will be the most easily admitted, 
because it is not considered contrary to public policy by legal doctrine.107
There is no case law dealing with the issue of recognition of foreign 
judgments awarding punitive of multiple damages.108 Indeed, it has recently 
been proposed that the possibility for the judge to award punitive damages in 
case of wilful tort or breach of contract be introduced in French civil law.109
105 Art. 11 reads as follows: “(1) Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be 
refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including 
exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or 
harm suffered. (2) The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what 
extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses 
relating to the proceedings.” 
106 Art. 15 reads as follows: “Recognition or enforcement of a severable part of a 
judgment shall be granted where recognition or enforcement of that part is applied 
for, or only part of the judgment is capable of being recognised or enforced under 
this Convention.” The solution appears clearly from the Explanatory Report by T. 
Hartley and M. Dogauchi, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court 
Agreements, edited by the Permanent Bureau of The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, <http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf>, 62, no. 215. 
107 See, O. Boskovic, ‘Les dommages et intérêts en droit international privé. Ne pas 
manquer une occasion de progrès’, La Semaine Juridique: Juris Classeur 
Periodique 2006.I.163. The author expressed the same opinion in his dissertation, O. 
Boskovic, La réparation du préjudice en droit international privé, (Paris: LGDJ 
2003) nos. 408 ff., stressing that what can hurt the public policy of the forum is not 
the punitive ground of damages, but its eventual excessive amount. See also, G. 
Légier, ‘Sources extracontractuelles des obligations. Domaine de la loi compétente’, 
J.-Cl. Droit international, Fasc. 553-2, 1993, 101. 
108 The only exception seems to be CA Paris, 21 September 1995, Recueil Dalloz-
Sirey 1996, somm. 168, where recognition was granted and the defendant argument 
of violation of public policy by excessive and punitive damages was rejected. The 
motivation of the case is, however, not sufficiently developed. 
109 Art. 1371, proposal of reform of the law of obligations:  "L’auteur d’une faute 
manifestement délibérée, et notamment d’une faute lucrative, peut être condamné, 
outre les dommages-intérêts compensatoires, à des dommages-intérêts punitifs dont 
le juge a la faculté de faire bénéficier pour une part le Trésor public. La décision du 
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Even if this proposal has not entered into force yet, it is at present impossible 
to consider the French legal system incompatible with non-compensatory 
sorts of damages in order to refuse enforcement of foreign judgments having 
awarded multiple or punitive damages. This is especially the case for US 
judgments in which punitive damages are awarded in proportion to 
compensatory damages and in which the award can be reduced after judicial 
scrutiny in case a reasonable proportion was not met (as was decided by the 
US Supreme court in 1996 according to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).110
4.4 Pan European perspective 
More generally, from a pan European point of view, it is currently difficult 
to consider that damages awards going beyond the compensation of the 
injured party can be contrary to public policy. It is true that the right to 
compensation has a supra-legislative nature, recognised both by the French 
Constitutional Council111 and the European Court of Human Rights.112
However, it is generally admitted that full compensation is not a right 
protected by the ECvHT and that, as a consequence, a limitation of liability 
juge d’octroyer de tels dommages-intérêts doit être spécialement motivée et leur 
montant distingué de celui des autres dommages-intérêts accordés à la victime. Les 
dommages-intérêts punitifs ne sont pas assurables.” 
110 BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore, 517 United States Supreme Court Reports 
559 (1996). Later, the Supreme Court gave additional guidance for the application of 
the proportion and nexus test in State Farm Mut. Auto Insur. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
United States Supreme Court Reports 408 (2003). 
111 See e.g. CC 9 November 1999, 99-419 DC, La Semaine Juridique: Juris 
Classeur Periodique 1999.II.20173, with annotation G. Viney: "la faculté d’agir en 
responsabilité met en œuvre une exigence constitutionnelle posée par l’article 4 de la 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789 dont il résulte que tout fait 
quelconque de l’homme qui cause à autrui un dommage oblige celui par la faute 
duquel il est arrivé à le réparer." On this issue, N. Molfessis, ‘La réécriture de la loi 
relative au PACS par le Conseil constitutionnel’, La Semaine Juridique: Juris 
Classeur Periodique. 2000.I.210. 
112 ECHR 20 November 1995, Pressos Compania Naviera v. Belgium, >1995@ 21 
European Human Rights Reports 301; Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil. 1996, 
1019, with observations J.-P. Marguenaud, for tortious liability; ECHR 9 November 
1994, Stran Greek Refineries And Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, >1994@ 19 European 
Human Rights Reports 293; Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil. 1995, 652, with 
observations F. Zenati, for contractual liability. Both cases decided that a liability 
claim is a credit protected by Protocol 1 to the ECvHR. 
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included in an international convention is valid.113 This solution has 
generally permitted European legal systems to cap the compensation of 
certain categories of victims, which is nowadays frequent when the 
compensation is shifted from a liability system to be provided by ‘solidarity 
systems’, notably through special compensation schemes. In the literature it 
has been concluded that the principle of full compensation is now no longer 
a fundamental principle of the law that is internationally protected through 
the exception of public policy.114 It is therefore difficult to understand why, 
at the same time, public policy should not be opposed to the statutory 
reduction of the compensation awarded to the victim, but should be allergic 
to its extension. Such a solution would be only understandable if tort law 
were considered as having a mere compensatory function and not a deterring 
or punitive function. However, following the evolution of statutory law and 
case law in European jurisdictions, legal doctrine is increasingly of the 
opinion that tort law does in fact have such functions (although not as much 
as in the US), at least when the liable party is at fault.115
The legal arguments expressed above can argue in favour of the Res 
Judicata effect of a US class action judgment that also awards punitive or 
multiple damages. It seems that in France such a judgment can be enforced 
entirely. In other European countries, the US judgment can be partially 
enforced, that is to say without the punitive award, which is considered a 
criminal sanction. However, the fact that part of the judgement will be 
enforceable prevents individual absent class members from bringing a new 
claim in these countries. This in turn is a sufficient condition for a US court 
to certify a transnational class, including absent class members residing in 
these jurisdictions. We can therefore conclude that the prospect that a US 
class action judgment may award punitive damages is not an obstacle to its 
(partial) Res Judicata effect. 
Furthermore, there is also a practical consideration indicating that 
punitive damages class action awards will generate little recognition issues 
in European jurisdictions: Punitive damages are rarely awarded in multi-state 
and, a fortiori, transnational class actions. Apart from the issue of Res 
Judicata effect of the prospective judgment in the country of residence of 
113 See, in France, Cass. Civ. I, 12 May 2004, Bulletin des Arrêts de la Chambre 
Civile de la Cour de Cassation. I, n° 136; La Semaine Juridique: Juris Classeur 
Periodique. 2005.II.10030, with annotation G. Légier. 
114 G. Viney, P. Jourdain, ‘Les effets de la responsabilité: exécution et réparation en 
nature, dommages et intérêts, aménagements légaux et conventionnels de la 
responsabilité, assurance de responsabilité,’ in J. Ghestin (ed.) Traité de droit civil
(Paris: LGDJ 2001, 2nd ed.) no. 60 and the references quoted: "[...] n’est pas rangé 
aujourd’hui parmi les quelques principes essentiels du droit français qui demeurent 
protégés sur le plan international par l’exception d’ordre public". 
115 See e.g. S. Carval, ‘La responsabilité civile dans sa fonction de peine privée’,
(Paris: LGDJ 1995), which also refers repeatedly to foreign experiences. 
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absent class members, there are several obstacles under US law to the 
certification of a punitive damages class action claim.116 This does not mean 
that multi-state class actions concerning punitive damages are never 
certified,117 but it does mean that certification is rendered much more 
difficult. For instance, punitive damages are usually matters of state law and 
that may indicate that if more than one state is involved, the requirement of 
commonality is not met.118 Moreover, an opt-out class action may jeopardise 
the punitive damage assessment, because individual plaintiffs can be 
awarded punitive damages beyond the award in the class action procedure if 
they opt out and decide to bring a claim individually. These complications 
lead to a reduction of punitive damages class action claims and indeed incite 
authors to propose innovative solutions to tackle the issue of compensation 
and deterrence in mass torts.119
5 Jurisdiction of US courts concerning absent class members and Res
Judicata in Europe 
Finally, the most disputed issue in some European legal systems concerns 
jurisdiction of the US courts concerning absent class members. One of the 
traditional conditions for recognition of foreign judgment is the assessment 
of the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Normally this issue arises only with 
regard to subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. It is widely accepted that there is no point in assessing personal 
jurisdiction with regard to the plaintiff, because, by suing in a foreign 
country, they have simply withdrawn from their jurisdictional prerogatives 
to sue in another country, such as the one of their domicile. It is a logical 
consequence of the estoppel theory: one cannot claim in a foreign court and 
then before the courts of one’s domicile, pretending the former had no 
jurisdiction. The idea is clearly expressed in English law by Dicey & 
Morris.120 In France, this has long been analysed as a waiver of the recently 
116 On this issue, L. J. Hines, ‘Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in Class 
Actions’, 36 Wake Forest Law Review 889 (2001), and the case law quoted. 
117 For a famous example of certification, see In re“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 100 Federal Rules Decisions 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
118 L. J. Hines, above n. 116. 
119 See e.g. C. M. Sharkey, ‘Punitive Damages as Societal Damages’, 113 Yale Law 
Journal 347 (2003). 
120 Rule 36, at 487: “[…] a court of a foreign country outside the United Kingdom 
has jurisdiction to give a judgment in personam capable of enforcement or 
recognition […] if the judgment debtor was claimant or counterclaimed, in the 
foreign court.” 
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abolished121 plaintiff’s privilege of jurisdiction of article 14 of the French 
Civil Code. According to this provision, a French citizen (or resident)122 can 
bring proceedings against a foreign defendant before French courts, even 
concerning obligations imposed on the defendant in a foreign court.123 The 
same goes for the Netherlands in the case of a foreign judgment having been 
rendered against a litigant who commenced the litigation abroad, because it 
would be contrary to good faith and fairness to permit the plaintiff to 
relitigate his claim after having sought the aid of a foreign court which 
ultimately rejected his claim.124
However, as noted above, the US class action procedure, through the 
opt-out mechanism, allows inclusion in the group of plaintiffs of persons 
who have not explicitly manifested their intention of bringing a claim before 
a foreign court. Therefore, it is not certain that foreign absent class members 
have both accepted jurisdiction of the foreign court and at the same time 
prevented foreign courts from assessing the existence of personal jurisdiction 
in their respect at the stage of recognition abroad. The first step is therefore 
to determine whether a court that is asked to recognize a US class action 
judgment is obliged to verify that the US court had personal jurisdiction over 
absent class members residing in the forum. That is not generally a condition 
required for recognition but the peculiarity of US class actions procedures 
does seem to require such supplementary investigation by the court in order 
to decide on recognition of a judgment rendered after following this 
procedure. The absence of case law on this point renders the issue very 
complex. 
In the case that a US court is required to have personal jurisdiction 
over foreign absent class members, an explicit acceptance by these members 
will be necessary, because the transposition of personal jurisdiction 
requirements regarding defendants to foreign absent plaintiffs will very often 
lead to the conclusion that there is no personal jurisdiction other than 
voluntary. 
121 Cass. Civ. I, 22 May 2007, Banque de développement local, no. 04-14716, Gaz. 
Pal. 2 June 2007, 11, with note M.-L. Niboyet. The privilege was abolished because 
art. 14 is no longer seen as introducing a case of exclusive jurisdiction, but a merely 
facultative one. 
122 Following, article 4(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (2001/44/EC). Cf. H. 
Gaudemet-Tallon, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe: règlement no. 
44/2001 : conventions de Bruxelles et de Lugano (Paris: LGDJ 2002, 3rd ed.), no. 95. 
123 Cass. Civ. I, 30 June 1992, Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 1994, 169, with note Guez, 
considering that the plaintiff waived their privilege by suing abroad, even if an 
action in France was initially proposed. 
124 The leading case being, Hoge Raad, 14 November 1925, Fur Coat case,
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1925, 91. On the issue, see H. Smit, ‘International Res 
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in The Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis’, 16 
Buffalo Law Review 165 (1966), at 197. 
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Therefore, the question is whether the absence of opt-out declarations of 
certified class members is sufficient to establish consent of the foreign 
absent member to jurisdiction. Although this legal issue is often confused 
with the matter of conformity of the opt-out mechanism with public policy, it 
must be distinguished intellectually because the two issues do not converge 
at the same level of scrutiny of the foreign judgment. However, in practice, 
the answer to the question of the validity of consent to US jurisdiction by 
absent class members can depend strongly on the analysis of the actual opt-
out mechanism. Indeed, when it is considered that the right for absent class 
members to opt out from a class action lawsuit grants them sufficient 
protection and is therefore not contrary to international public policy, it is 
possible to conclude that the absence of opting out is also a valid consent of 
the absent plaintiff to the jurisdiction of US courts. Consequently, 
jurisdiction of the US courts cannot be challenged any longer at the stage of 
foreign recognition.  
Of course, all this depends on whether the assessment of consent to 
the action will be assessed in the application of US law or of the law of the 
forum where the Res Judicata effect is sought.  
If US law is applicable to determine this, the conformity of an opt-
out mechanism to public policy will be sufficient to satisfy the jurisdiction 
prong required by most European legal systems as a condition for 
recognition of foreign judgments. Indeed, according to Shutts, personal 
jurisdiction requirements concerning defendants do not apply to absent class 
members and the failure to opt out is considered to be sufficient, because 
absent class members do not bear the same burdens as foreign defendants, as 
they do not need to appoint an attorney nor bear the costs of the litigation 
and are not exposed to counterclaims.125 Therefore, a state court has personal 
jurisdiction over absent class members residing in other states even if they 
do not have any connection with the forum, provided only that they benefit 
from some specific guarantees, such as the notification of their inclusion in 
the class, a right to a fair representation and, above all, the right to opt out of 
the class: all guarantees that are granted by rule 23 of the Federal Rules on 
Civil Procedure. Even though this has been opposed by some authors,126 it is 
accepted by judicial practice127 that this condition required for multi-state 
class actions can also be applied to transnational class action. Therefore, 
125 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 United States Supreme Court Reports 797 
(1985). 
126 D. L. Bassett, ‘US Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions and 
Personal Jurisdiction’, 72 Fordham Law Review 41 (2003/2004), arguing that a 
court has personal jurisdiction over foreign absent class members only in case they 
expressly join the lawsuit by opting in. 
127 See the references quoted by D. L. Bassett, id.
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according to US law, a US court has jurisdiction over foreign absent class 
members since they have an actual right to opt out. 
Only in cases in which a lex fori assessment of personal jurisdiction 
over absent class members is made will the public policy and jurisdiction 
prongs be two different conditions, to be met cumulatively. The result will 
be that recognition is often refused, for lack of personal jurisdiction. For 
example, in English law a foreign court is considered to have personal 
jurisdiction only if the party is resident in the foreign jurisdiction where the 
action is brought or has submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court by 
making a positive claim or counterclaim, by making a voluntary appearance 
in a claim already proceeding or by virtue of a previous agreement with the 
plaintiff. If these conditions are applied to the question of jurisdiction over 
absent class members, it appears that an English court will refuse recognition 
of a US class action judgment, for lack of personal jurisdiction.128
The answer to this question is difficult to give, since European 
courts have not had the opportunity to be confronted with a similar situation. 
My impression is that the important procedural guarantees that absent class 
members benefit from under rule 23 of the Federal Rules on Civil Procedure, 
together with the very limited burdens of the procedure, will probably incite 
European courts to give Res Judicata effect to US class action judgments or 
settlements. The advantages of this solution certainly outweigh the 
inconveniences. 
6 Conclusion: The hostility of European legal systems seems to decline 
The previous analysis seems to suggest that the hostility of European legal 
systems towards granting Res Judicata effect to US class action judgments is 
progressively declining. This is the consequence of a general acceptance of 
the necessity of renovating the old-continent civil procedures with tools 
allowing the consolidation of individual claims in collective claims. This has 
already been enacted, under different forms and for particular types of 
litigation, in several European legal systems. Moreover, at the level of the 
European Union several steps have been taken towards the introduction of 
collective claims. The vote of 27 March 2007 on a report on the European 
Commission’s Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules showed the opening of European institutions towards the 
enactment of collective claims tools. Even though the intention not to adopt 
a US-like class action has been manifested, these steps are evident marks of 
128 This was the main point of divergence between Harris (for the class) and (for the 
defendant) Staughton expert opinions in the Royal Dutch Shell class action: the 
former considering that the personal jurisdiction requirement only concerns the 
defendant, the latter arguing for its application to foreign class members. 
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declining hostility towards collective settlements of consumer and security 
litigations.
Although this is still in the domain of prospective legal reform, this 
article has tried to show that the recent developments in European 
jurisdictions’ laws go in the direction of the easier recognition of US class 
actions judgments. It has demonstrated that the issue of recognition does not 
aim at its enforcement against a losing defendant, but rather at preventing 
disappointed European absent class members to start new, individual 
lawsuits against the very same defendant before a court in a European 
jurisdiction. The serious prospect of potential recognition is a condition 
required by US courts to grant certification to a group of plaintiffs which 
also includes foreign absent class members. If European jurisdictions are 
prepared to give Res Judicata effect to US class action judgments, they will 
facilitate the certification of transnational class action. 
Traditionally, legal doctrine argues in favour of refusal of 
recognition for several reasons. The most incompatible US class action 
feature seems to be the opt-out rule by which plaintiffs are incorporated in 
the group that have not expressly manifested their will to claim. However, it 
appears that several European jurisdictions also use the opt-out mechanism, 
at least for specific claims. Whenever that is the case, it is difficult to assert 
that granting Res Judicata effect to judgments decided in favour or against 
absent class members is contrary to the public policy of the forum. The same 
goes when the argument is phrased in terms of absence of personal 
jurisdiction of the US court over the foreign plaintiff.  
On the other hand, the issue of US judgments awarding punitive or 
multiple damages is different. In most European jurisdictions, probably with 
the exception of France, a judgment awarding such damages will not be 
recognised. However, in such a case, Res Judicata will be refused only 
concerning the punitive part of the judgment, while the other parts – the 
ruling on the liability issue and the compensation of the damage suffered – 
will be recognised. It is this prospective partial recognition that counts for 
the US judge in order to allow certification of a transnational class action. 
The conclusion is that, in principle, European legal systems are no longer 
hostile towards the recognition of US class action judgments. 
In my opinion this is also a good approach from a practical point of 
view, since the hostility of a European legal system to US class actions 
would not only grant a sort of immunity to the corporations organised under 
its own laws, but would also reduce the protection of its own citizens, even 
against foreign corporations. It has been noted above that what counts is the 
possibility to recognise a US class action judgment in the country of 
residence of absent class members in order to prevent individual actions in 
that country, and not the enforcement in the country where the seat of the 
company is situated. Indeed, enforcement abroad is often not necessary, 
2008]      Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments      61 
since the defendant in a class action will probably have sufficient assets in 
the US. The consequence is that a corporation organised under the laws of 
Germany, for example, will not prevent certification of a transnational class 
action against it, because the enforcement of an eventual damages award in 
Germany will not be considered necessary by US courts, since there will be 
other ways to execute the judgment and make the defendant pay. Instead, 
refusing to recognise a US class action judgment in Germany would be 
disadvantageous for German consumers, because they would not be able to 
benefit from the access to justice granted by US courts even against a non-
German defendant. We can therefore conclude that, from a policy 
perspective, refusing to recognize a US class action judgment is not a good 
solution for European countries.129
          
129 American legal doctrine adds that such a solution could jeopardise the deterrence 
effect of a US class action suit. Ilana T. Buschkin, ‘The Viability of Class Action 
Lawsuits in a Globalised Economy. Permitting Foreign Claimants to Be Members of 
Class Actions Lawsuits in the US Federal Courts’, 90 Cornell Law Review 1563 
(2005). 
